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ABSTRACT   
 
Improvement and Indication of Reliability have been identified as important user needs within the e-Navigation 
strategy of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This paper address the question, how these user 
needs can be satisfied in future with respect to resilient provision of position navigation and timing (PNT) data 
onboard the vessel. The idea of an onboard PNT Module is proposed as front-end between an integrated PNT 
system and ship-side applications like INS, AIS and ECDIS. The paper focuses on the integrity monitoring within 
the PNT Module. The concept is introduced and first experimental results are presented. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
  
Position fixing systems are identified as one 
strategic key element of e-Navigation [1]. For the 
reliability improvement of position and other PNT 
parameter of a vessel, not only the ship-side 
components but the whole integrated PNT system 
needs to be considered. An overview of this 
maritime integrated PNT System is shown in Fig.1. 
It is the sum of satellite-based, ashore and aboard 
components and its related links. Only the 
integrated use of these components enables the 
accurate and reliable provision of position, 
navigation and timing information to all maritime 
applications. 
 
Fig. 1. Overview Integrated PNT System 
 
Existing and future World Wide Radio Navigation 
Systems (WWRNS) like GPS, GLONASS and 
GALILEO are fundamental infrastructures for 
global positioning. Additionally, shore-side services 
as part of the Maritime Service Portfolio (MSP) are 
used or considered as candidates to improve the 
positioning performance (augmentation services: 
e.g. IALA Beacon DGNSS, RTK), to support the 
backup functionality (backup services: e.g. e-
LORAN, R-Mode), or to provide PNT relevant 
Maritime Safety Information (MSI: service level, 
tidal information).  
This paper focuses on the ship-side part of the 
maritime integrated PNT System. Section 1 
provides an overview of the current PNT system 
and introduces our concept of an on-board maritime 
PNT Module. In Section 2 first results of a 
preliminary realization of such a PNT Module will 
presented.   
 
 
1.  PNT Module Concept  
 
1.1. Overview of current situation  
 
Currently, vessels subject to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
[2] can either use single sensors to provide the PNT 
parameter (e.g. position, heading, speed over 
ground) individually or use an Integrated 
Navigation System (INS) [3]. Fig. 2 represents the 
single sensor approach. Stand-alone equipment 
provides only sensor-specific PNT data e.g. 
WWRNS sensors for position, velocity and time 
data (PVT) and other ship-side sensors for 
navigation data (N). The shipboard processing layer 
is part of the applied sensors and represents the 
internal used methods for the provision of 
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respective PNT data. The onboard staff has to fuse 
the information from the different sensors.  
 
Fig. 2 Single sensor approach 
 
In the current INS approach, the sensors deliver 
their individually determined PNT output data to a 
shipboard processing layer, which is illustrated in 
Fig. 3. The INS is performing plausibility checks on 
the incoming data and consistency checks on 
different sensors. Integrity is expected, if 
plausibility and consistency checks are passed [4]. 
For instance, the position integrity monitoring is 
based on: (i) comparison with a second WWRNS 
sensor; (ii) processing an output of the Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring of a WWRNS 
sensor and (iii) dead reckoning. However, the 
WWRNS sensors might have common failure 
modes (like multipath, interference, and jamming) 
and hence not all possible failures can be detected 
by comparing both sensors. For the RAIM 
functionality, neither the RAIM functionality itself 
is specified nor the output of it. The last integrity 
step, the comparison with dead reckoning is only 
capable of detecting large position jumps. This 
means, that in last consequence the application of 
plausibility and consistency tests is insufficient to 
guarantee the reliability of INS outputs regarding 
accuracy assessment. 
 
Fig. 3 Approach of current INS   
 
1.2. PNT Module concept 
 
In order to overcome these problems identified 
above, a PNT data processing unit (abbreviated by 
PNT Unit) is introduced into the shipboard 
processing layer of a future INS, as illustrated in 
Fig. 4. By means of sensor fusion techniques, this 
PNT Unit integrates all available PVT and N data 
from onboard sensors in order to provide optimal 
PNT output data. In addition to the current INS 
approach, the onboard sensors (here especially the 
GNSS Receivers) should also provide their raw 
data (e.g. code and phase measurements, navigation 
data) to the PNT Unit. This enables the usage of 
advanced sensor fusion techniques, which will 
improve the resilience of PNT information by 
application of integrity monitoring functions. As a 
new functionality, the PNT Unit will not only 
provide optimal estimations of the PNT output data 
but also integrity information based on accuracy 
estimations. A definition of integrity and an 
overview of our integrity monitoring concept will 
be given in sections 1.3. and 1.4. 
 
 
Fig. 4 PNT Unit approach 
 
The PNT Module with its data processing Unit will 
be part of the integrated PNT System and can either 
be part of a future modular structured INS (see Fig. 
4). Alternatively a stand-alone PNT Unit may offer 
enhanced functionality in the absence of an INS. 
 
1.3. Understanding of Integrity 
 
Integrity can be categorized into “data integrity” 
and “system integrity”. Data integrity is given, if 
the desired output data is provided at the expected 
time in the specified formats, and meanwhile, the 
specific accuracy requirements are fulfilled. System 
integrity is given, if (1) the integrity of all output 
data of a system is fulfilled and (2) the output data, 
additional status messages, and alert messages are 
provided in a timely, complete, unambiguous and 
accurate manner. From the definitions it can be 
seen that the system integrity can only be given as 
long as the system realizes its tasks with the 
required performance. According to these 
definitions, integrity monitoring needs to include 
error estimations for all output data. These 
estimated errors need to be compared against given 
accuracy requirements. Whenever these 
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requirements are not fulfilled, an alert message 
should be generated within a specified time.     
Compared to the current INS approach, an 
implementation of this integrity definition requires 
an introduction of an error estimation of all output 
data onboard a vessel. Currently, only rough 
assumptions are made in terms of positioning 
accuracy. Whenever a GNSS Standard Positioning 
Service (SPS) is used, an accuracy of better than 
100 m is expected. Whenever an IALA Beacon 
DGNSS Service is used, an accuracy of better than 
10m is assumed.    
An implementation of integrity monitoring requires 
that the technical requirements on systems or 
required PNT data should be specified by 
unambiguous performance quantities (e.g. 
accuracy, availability..). 
Such specifications are needed for all PNT data 
such as given in Res. A.915(22) [5] as requirements 
on future GNSS for horizontal position and in Res. 
A 1046 [6] as requirements on a World Wide Radio 
Navigation System (WWRNS). 
 
1.3. Integrity monitoring concept 
 
For a PNT unit, integrity monitoring can be carried 
out in three sequential steps. The first step is the 
test of individual sensors including provided sensor 
data. The second step is the compatibility test of 
similar data from different sensors. The third step is 
the fault detection and identification in the 
integration algorithm. A general integrity 
monitoring approach is depicted in Fig. 5. These 
steps will be briefly introduced in the following 
parts:  
 
A.  Individual sensor tests 
 
Individual sensor tests include plausibility and 
validity checks. The plausibility check tests 
whether the sensor raw data or derived navigational 
result falls into predefined value range. For 
example, an output of 181º from a gyrocompass 
ranging between -180º to +180º is not plausible. 
The validity is tested by comparing the sensor data 
or derived navigational results with formal and 
logical criteria, such as whether they fit the ships’ 
maneuver or dynamic properties, or whether they 
are consistent with the environment nearby. For 
example, if the output of a speed log is larger than 
the maximal achievable speed of the ship, a sensor 
failure can be assured.  
B. Compatibility test of sensor data  
 
Once a specific output can be provided by more 
than one sensor, different sensor data can be 
compared to perform the compatibility tests based 
on a common measurement model. A significant 
discrepancy between different sensors implies the 
failure of at least one of these sensors. The upper 
bound for deviation should be defined either a 
priori or in real-time according to the previous 
measurements. Additionally, compatibility tests 
evaluating the time behavior of successive provided 
sensor data can be applied. The compatibility test 
should be carried out before sending the sensor data 
to integration algorithms.  
 
Fig. 5 Example of  integrity monitoring for PNT unit with GNSS, IMU and Log as applied sensors 
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C. Fault detection for integrated navigation 
system 
 
The plausibility, validity and compatibility tests are 
suitable for detecting gross sensor failure but not 
sensitive for slight error, time-variant errors and 
drifts. The Kalman filter-based algorithm could 
offer high sensitivity of detecting these errors. 
Integrity monitoring based on Kalman filter can be 
categorized into the following approaches [7]. 
 
1) Kalman filter estimates (bias check) 
In a Kalman filter, the sensor measurement biases 
can be estimated. If an estimated bias is 
significantly larger than the error level specified by 
the manufacturer, there is likely a failure in the 
sensor. 
2) Innovation-based approaches 
The innovations indicate the consistency of the 
actual measurements and the measurements 
predicated by state estimates. Innovation filtering 
may be used to detect large discrepancies 
immediately, whereas innovation sequence 
monitoring enables smaller discrepancies to be 
detected over time. 
3) Residual-based approaches 
The above-mentioned innovation filtering and 
sequence monitoring can also be expanded to 
residuals. Residuals have a smaller covariance than 
innovation, making them more sensitive for error 
detection [7]. The only shortcoming is that the 
processing of residuals is not an essential part of a 
Kalman filter routine and needs extra computing 
time.  
Another popular approach related to residuals is the 
DIA (Detection, Identification and Adaption) 
approach [8], which is based on the a posteriori 
variance factor for a least-squares adjustment.   
4) Parallel solution of multiple sub-filters 
Parallel-solutions integrity monitoring maintains a 
number of parallel navigation solutions or sub-
filters, each excluding data from one sensor or radio 
navigation signal. Each additional navigation 
solution is compared with the main filter using a 
consistency test. A significant inconsistency 
indicates a fault in the sensor or signal omitted from 
main filter. The system output is then switched to 
the solution omitting the faulty sensor or signal. 
The main drawback lies in the increased 
computational burden and hence this technique is 
preferably used for failure identification rather than 
failure detection. 
 
2. PNT Unit realization 
 
In order to demonstrate the opportunities of a PNT 
Unit concept, a prototype of such a PNT Unit is 
under development within our research project.  
 
2.1. Sensor selection 
 
The provision of PNT information is seen as the 
basic function of a PNT Module. In the preliminary 
design the following parameters have been chosen 
as output parameters: (1) Position (longitude, 
latitude, height); (2) Speed Over Ground (SOG); (3) 
Course Over Ground (COG); (4) Attitude: roll, 
pitch, yaw (heading); (5) Rate of Turn (ROT); (6) 
UTC time. 
IMO has furthermore identified the requirements 
for redundancy, particularly in relation to position 
fixing systems [1].  IALA has given a classification 
of alternative navigation systems in relation to their 
objectives [9]: 
1 A redundant system provides the same 
functionality as the primary system, allowing a 
seamless transition with no change in procedures. 
2 A backup system ensures continuation of 
the navigation application, but not necessarily with 
the full functionality of the primary system and may 
necessitate some change in procedures by the user. 
3 A contingency system allows safe 
completion of a maneuver, but may not be adequate 
for long-term use. 
 
According to this classification, sensors used in a 
PNT Unit as well as the relevant outputs are 
identified in Table 1. 
 
 Pos COG SOG Hea-ding 
ROT Time
Major GNSS 
device 
M M R   M 
Second GNSS 
device 
R R R R B R 
Second GNSS 
system 
R R R   R 
Second GNSS 
signal 
R R R   R 
EM Log   B    
Doppler Log   M    
Magnet Compass    B B  
Gyrocompass    M B  
THD    B B  
ROT indicator     M  
IMU C C C C C  
e-Loran B     B 
R-mode B     B 
e-Pelorus C   C   
Table 1 Sensors and Output (M-Main R- 
Redundency B-Backup C-Contigency) 
 
An Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) can bridge 
GNSS outages within certain duration and can 
therefore be seen as a short-term contingency for 
most of PNT parameters. The diversity of IMU 
outputs can furthermore enable integrity monitoring 
for relevant parameters. Due to these advantages we 
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have chosen an IMU as an additional sensor for the 
PNT Unit. A limitation of IMU in maritime 
navigation lies in accuracy degradation for long-
term operation, so that the integration of IMU with 
other navigation sensors is necessary to realize a 
long-term stable operation. 
 
 
2.2. Measurement campaign 
 
In order to collect test data for the development and 
test of the PNT Unit, first measurement campaigns 
have been performed in cooperation with the 
Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) 
on the survey and research vessel DENEB. The 
vessel was equipped with 3 GNSS antennas and 
receivers (type: Javad Delta), an IMU (type iMar 
IVRU FCAI), a gyrocompass, a Doppler speed log, 
an electromagnetic speed log and other standard 
shipborne sensors. Fig. 6 shows the vessel DENEB, 
where the red circles mark the positions of the 3 
GNSS antennas and the yellow circle indicates the 
position of the IMU installed near the centerline 
inside the vessel. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Vessel DENEB with sensor locations 
In this section, preliminary data analysis for the 
data collected on 5th July from 10:00 to 11:00 
(local time) near the port of Rostock is presented. 
The trajectory of the vessel is shown in Fig. 
7Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden.. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Trajectory of vessel DENEB 
 
Leaving the Warnow River, the vessel performed 
an anti-clockwise turning maneuver and finally it 
left the port and led into the Baltic Sea. Based on 
the master station located near Rostock port, 
differential positioning with carrier phase 
measurements have been performed in post-
processing to obtain the reference trajectory in 
centimeter accuracy. The preliminary results focus 
on the integrity monitoring using compatibility test 
and Kalman filter-based approaches.  
 
 
2.3. Consistent Common Reference System 
(CCRS)  
 
Due to the size of vessels and the distribution of 
sensors, the position and velocity information 
measured by different sensors need to be converted 
to a common consistent reference point (CCRP). 
Heading information, as well as the other Euler 
angles and their change rates are needed for this 
conversion. Therefore, an accurate determination of 
ships attitude and their temporal changes are a 
prerequisite for PNT parameter determination. 
Beside that, the integrity of the other output 
parameters like position and velocity relies also on 
the integrity of the attitude information. A detailed 
discussion of our PNT Unit based approach of 
attitude determination can be found in [10]. Here 
only the basic ideas will be briefly introduced.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the standard sensor 
for heading determination is the gyrocompass. If it 
is properly settled, it provides long-term stability. 
However, the accuracy depends on the actual ship 
motion and is limited to few degrees (see [10], [6]). 
The usage of a 3 antenna GNSS-Compass with a 
large baseline length (as we have installed it on the 
vessel DENEB) yields a significant higher accuracy 
of < 0.1deg.  
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Fig. 8 Heading determination using GNSS-compass 
in quasi-static scenario at port 
 
In Fig. 8 the heading determined with a GNSS-
compass is shown for quasi-static scenario, where 
the real movement of the vessel is so week that can 
be neglected. Additionally, the current challenges 
of a GNSS-compass are shown.  
The red star indicates the epochs at which GNSS-
compass does not output reliable results. The 
quality of the GNSS-compass can be evaluated by 
the baseline length (see lower graph in Fig. 8), 
which should keep unchanged as long as the GNSS 
carrier phase measurements are correctly processed. 
It can be seen, that the unreliable heading results 
can be detected by larger variations in the baseline 
length. These outliers might occur with a failed 
solution of integer ambiguities, which is the most 
crucial step within the GNSS-compass data 
processing.  
From the discussions above it can be concluded that 
a GNSS-compass offers high accuracy whereas 
limited availability and continuity. In order to 
overcome these limitations, a GNSS-compass 
should be used in combination with other sensors, 
like an IMU. 
 
In a sensor fusion scheme, an IMU can be used for 
the detection of GNSS compass outliers and as well 
as for the provision of a backup during the times of 
GNSS compass outages. Therefore, within our 
prototype PNT Unit, an attitude determination 
based on the fusion of a GNSS-compass and an 
IMU serves as an accurate and reliable basis of a 
CCRS. 
 
 
2.4. Integrity monitoring with compatibility tests 
 
As mentioned before, the second step integrity 
monitoring refers to the compatibility test for PNT 
data obtained from different sensors. As an 
example, the compatibility tests for SOG 
determination are presented in the following.  
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Fig. 9 (a) SOG determined by the different GNSS 
antennas, (b) SOG difference of antenna 2-1 of raw 
sensor data and using converted data within a 
CCRS 
In Fig. 9 (a) the SOG data, determined by the three 
different GNSS antenna (see Fig. 6) are shown. One 
can clearly see systematic differences especially 
during the turning maneuver around 10:30 local 
time and at the end of the scenario. As it is 
illustrated in Fig. 9 (b), these systematic differences 
indeed vanish if the sensor raw data are converted 
into a CCRS. For the SOG compatibility tests 
within the integrity monitoring one either accepts 
larger systematic differences between distributed 
sensors or needs to convert the sensor data into a 
CCRS before performing the compatibility test. The 
second option has the disadvantage that the 
integrity tests for one output parameter (e.g. SOG) 
depends on the availability and integrity the CCRS 
itself.   
 
2.5 Integrity monitoring within the sensor fusion  
 
The PNT Unit concept (see Fig. 4) enables the 
usage of sensor raw data within the sensor fusion 
algorithm. In order to demonstrate the advantage of 
this approach we have implemented a tightly 
coupled GNSS/IMU sensor fusion algorithm based 
on an extended Kalman Filter. A detailed 
description of the implementation can be found in 
[11]. In this paper only the basic ideas and results 
are presented.  
 
In contrast to a loosely coupled GNSS/IMU 
Kalman filter, where the position results of a GNSS 
receiver is used as an input, in a tightly coupled 
Kalman filter the raw pseudorange measurements 
from each satellite in view are processed in the 
filter. This allows a failure detection of each 
individual GNSS observable. As an essential step of 
the Kalman filter routine, the calculation of the 
innovation vector reflects the deviation of the 
predicted pseudoranges with respect to the real 
measurements. As long as the dynamic model is 
working properly, the innovation vector mainly 
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reflects the potential failures hidden on each 
measurement. Based on this fact, the failures 
manifest themselves as abnormal jumps in the 
innovation sequence of a specific measurement. 
This is the basis for integrity monitoring based on 
innovation checks in a Kalman filter.  
 
In this paper, we present a very simple fault 
detection and adaptation scheme, where we use a 
fixed threshold for innovation magnitude of 
pseudoranges in order to detect and remove faulty 
measurements. The trajectories processed using 
single-point positioning and GPS/IMU integration 
with satellite filter are depicted in Fig. 10, where 
the graph at the left-hand side shows the whole 
trajectory within one hour and the graph at the 
right-hand side is a zoom-in for the first 20 minutes 
for a clearer illustration.  
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Fig. 10 Tightly-coupled GPS/IMU integration with satellite filtering 
 
The GPS/IMU integration gives a much smoother 
trajectory compared to the GPS-only solutions. In 
order to show the improvements in terms of 
accuracy, the absolute positioning errors in the 
horizontal plane are calculated by comparing with 
the reference trajectory and presented in Fig. 11. 
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Fig. 11 Horizontal accuracy of tightly-coupled 
GPS/IMU integration with satellite filtering 
 
The integrated system shows stable errors limited to 
3 meters for most of the observation epochs. 
Contrarily, the GPS-only results present significant 
outliers. A more detailed analysis [11] shows that 
these errors are caused by signal distortions from 
low elevation satellites. The innovation filter 
automatically detects and removes these faulty 
measurements.   
The conventional GPS/IMU integration works also 
without satellite exclusion. The dynamics measured 
by IMU could somehow adjust the positioning 
errors caused by low measurement quality. 
InFehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden. the corresponding trajectory is also 
illustrated, together with its counterparts using 
single-point positioning and using the integration 
with satellite filtering. 
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    Fig. 8  Tightly-coupled GPS/IMU integration with and 
without satellite filtering 
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It can be seen that the innovation-based exclusion 
of low-quality measurements has the dominant 
effect in the accuracy improvement. This example 
also reveals the importance of the integrity 
monitoring in the measurement domain.  
 
Summary 
 
In this paper, the maritime integrated PNT Module 
as the on-board part of maritime PNT system is 
introduced. The aim of the PNT Module is the 
resilient provision of position, navigation and 
timing information taking into account performance 
requirements coming from different service areas 
and navigational tasks.  
The core of the PNT Module is a PNT data 
processing Unit enabling the integrated utilization 
of all available sensor data to establish the needed 
redundancy for improved PNT data provision and 
integrity monitoring. The benefits of such a PNT 
Unit are shown at examples regarding different 
integrity monitoring methods. 
The CCRS as the prerequisite for the fusion of data 
from different sensors at different locations is 
introduced. From the examples of compatibility 
tests for SOG sensors, the importance of conversion 
of sensor data into a CCRS is demonstrated. 
Integrity tests based on a tightly-coupled GPS/IMU 
integration are able to identify and remove outliers 
of GNSS pseudorange measurements.  
 
The PNT Unit is on the one hand part of the 
integrated maritime PNT system. On the other it 
can be part of a future INS or alternatively a stand-
alone PNT Unit may offer enhanced functionality 
in the absence of an INS. 
 
This paper shows part of our works on the integrity 
monitoring within the maritime PNT System. 
Another important aspect of the integrity 
monitoring lies in the error estimation of PNT 
parameters. Corresponding results will be presented 
in our further publications.  
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